Evidence: Recent Develoopments in the Seventh Circuit by Conlon, William F. & O\u27Connor, William A.
Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 58 | Issue 2 Article 7
April 1982
Evidence: Recent Develoopments in the Seventh
Circuit
William F. Conlon
William A. O'Connor
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please
contact dginsberg@kentlaw.iit.edu.
Recommended Citation
William F. Conlon & William A. O'Connor, Evidence: Recent Develoopments in the Seventh Circuit , 58 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 417 (1982).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol58/iss2/7
EVIDENCE: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SEVENTH
CIRCUIT
WILLIAM F. CONLON*
WILLIAM A. O'CONNOR**
During the 1980-81 term, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit was called upon to answer a number of questions
concerning the Federal Rules of Evidence. The opinions relating to the
Federal Rules of Evidence resolved various issues of relevancy, privi-
lege, cross-examination and, in one interesting case, the scope of rule
407 with regard to strict liability actions.
In discussing the parameters of rule 401, the Seventh Circuit took
note of Professor McCormick's statement that "'[a] brick is not a
wall.' " But, while undoubtedly building towards a comprehensive
treatment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Seventh Circuit was
not called upon to build a "wall." Instead, the court's task was to pro-
vide a few "bricks" for practitioners to use in their efforts to comply
with the Federal Rules of Evidence. This article will discuss the most
significant evidence rulings of the Seventh Circuit during the 1980-81
term and will highlight opinions from other circuits where similar is-
sues were addressed.
RELEVANCY: RULES 401, 402 AND 403
The Federal Rules of Evidence define relevant evidence as "evi-
dence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence."' 2 All relevant evi-
dence is admissible unless otherwise provided by law.3 However, rule
403 states that even relevant evidence may be excluded "if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger ofunfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of
* Partner, Sidley & Austin, Chicago, Illinois; J.D., University of Illinois.
** Counsel to Governor James R. Thompson of Illinois; J.D., IIT/Chicago Kent College of
Law.
I. United States v. Greschner, 647 F.2d 740, 741 (7th Cir. 1981). Professor McCormick's
statement refers to the fact that several individual pieces of evidence often may have to be
presented in order to prove the existence of a fact that is in issue. See note 9 infra.
2. FED. R. EvD. 401.
3. FED. R. EviD. 402.
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undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evi-
dence."'4 The need for the evidence and its reliability are two factors
used to ascertain its probative value.5 Under the Seventh Circuit's in-
terpretations of the Federal Rules of Evidence, a trial judge must con-
duct a balancing of these factors in deciding whether to admit
evidence.6
The most interesting opinion on the issue of relevancy under rule
401 was that in United States v. Greschner.7 Greschner was an inmate
of the federal penitentiary at Marion, Illinois. While receiving a hair-
cut from a fellow inmate named Logan, Greschner stabbed him with a
homemade knife. At trial, Greschner represented himself and de-
fended on a theory of self-defense. In presenting this defense,
Greschner attempted to prove that Logan had a character trait for vio-
lence and that Logan had a motive to attack him. To prove these
points, Greschner sought to introduce evidence showing that Logan
had previously stabbed another inmate and that Logan's motive for
wanting to attack Greschner was that Logan thought Greschner had
called him an informer. In a jury trial, the district court excluded evi-
dence on each issue. Greschner was convicted of assault and of con-
veying a weapon within the prison.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the excluded evidence
was relevant under rule 401 and that its exclusion was "seriously preju-
dicial" to the defendant's theory of self-defense on the assault charge.8
Accordingly, the court reversed Greschner's conviction and remanded
the case for a new trial. In addressing the exclusion of evidence relat-
ing to Logan's character for violence, the Seventh Circuit gave an ex-
pansive, though literal, reading to rule 401, requiring only, as stated in
the rule, that the proferred evidence have "any tendency" to make a
fact of consequence more or less probable. 9 The excluded evidence re-
4. FED. R. EvW. 403.
5. The court should also consider the importance of the fact which the evidence is being
offered to prove in the context of the litigation as a whole, the length of the chain of inferences
necessary for the evidence to prove the fact it is being offered to prove, the availability of alterna-
tive means of proof, whether the fact which the evidence is being offered to prove is actually in
dispute, and, in appropriate cases, the potential effectiveness of a limiting instruction to the jury
under rule 105. See United States v. Dolliole, 597 F.2d 102 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 946
(1979); United States v. Ostrowski, 501 F.2d 318 (7th Cir. 1974).
6. See United States v. Price, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Dolliole, 597
F.2d 102 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 946 (1979).
7. 647 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1981).
8. Id at 743.
9. Id at 741. In its review of rule 401, the court looked to the Advisory Committee's Note
on the rule. That note makes clear, as the court found, that the standard of probability is not
stringent in considering whether evidence is relevant under rule 401:
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lating to Logan's possible motive for attacking Greschner was a "'brick
in his wall' "10 according to the court and thus met the requirements for
admissibility under rule 401. Looking to rule 404, "the court found no
bar to the admission of character evidence of the victim.
Greschner exemplifies the Seventh Circuit's generally consistent
application of the principles of relevancy during its 1980-81 term and
indicates the likelihood that the court will continue to follow a steady
and predictable course in this area of the law of evidence.
In United States v. Thomas,12 the court approved the admission of
certain photographs offered by the Government. Among the photo-
graphs were pictures of some of the defendants near a warehouse where
an alleged stolen automobile "chop shop" was being operated. Other
photos showed auto parts in the warehouse at the time the FBI exe-
cuted a search warrant. In a straightforward analysis, the Seventh Cir-
cuit rejected the defendant's relevancy argument and found that the
photographs were not unfairly prejudicial so as to warrant exclusion
under rule 403.13
Problems of relevancy call for an answer to the question whether an item of evi-
dence, when tested by the processes of legal reasoning, possesses sufficient probative
value to justify receiving it in evidence. Thus, assessment of the probative value of evi-
dence that a person purchased a revolver shortly prior to a fatal shooting with which he
is charged is a matter of analysis and reasoning.
Relevancy is not an inherent characteristic of any item of evidence but exists only as
a relation between an item of evidence and a matter properly provable in the case. Does
the item of evidence tend to prove the matter sought to be proved? Whether the relation-
ship exists depends upon principles evolved by experience or science, applied logically to
the situation at hand. . . . [Rule 4011 summarizes this relationship as a "tendency to
make the existence" of the fact to be proved "more probable or less probable."...
The standard of probability under the rule is "more ... probable than it would be
without the evidence." Any more stringent requirement is unworkable and unrealistic.
As McCormick § 152, p. 317, says, "A brick is not a wall," or, as Falknor, Extrinsic
Policies Affecting Admissibility, 10 Rutgers L. Rev. 574, 576 (1956), quotes Professor
McBaine, ".... [lt is not to be supposed that every witness can make a home run."
FED. R. EvID. 401, Advisory Committee's Note.
10. 647 F.2d at 743. Motive is the cause or reason that moves the will and induces action,
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 914 (5th ed. 1979), while intent is the mental state existing at the time
of the action, id. at 727. Evidence of motive is always admissible, dependent, of course, upon the
trial court's broad discretion. Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 414 (1894). Generally, de-
fendants may offer proof of good motive to contradict suggestions that motivation was bad.
United States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 1134 (10th Cir. 1969); May v. United States, 175 F.2d 994 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 830 (1949). Since there was no deviation from the general rule regard-
ing the admissibility of motive and since facts regarding Logan's belief that Greschner had called
him an informer were crucial to Greschner's defense, the Seventh Circuit was clearly correct in
reversing on this ground alone.
11. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2) provides that evidence of a crime victim's character is admissible
in certain limited circumstances.
12. No. 79-1465 (7th Cir. July 24, 1980) (unreported).
13. As the court stated:
The defendants failfed] to show how these photographs were unfairly prejudicial. The
photographs were not likely to inflame the emotions of the jury. See, e.g., United States
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In Thomas, the Seventh Circuit also approved admission of lay
opinion testimony by an FBI agent that the condition of the warehouse
at the time the search warrant was executed indicated that the defend-
ants "did not appear to have been operating an auto repair shop."' 4
The court concluded that the agent, who had financed part of his col-
lege education by working at an auto repair shop and who had rebuilt
several cars as a hobby, was qualified under rules 602' 5 and 70116 to
render such an opinion.' 7
Relevancy questions were also addressed in United States v. Lamp-
son. 8 Lampson and his nephew, Qualls, were charged with forcible
entry into a post office and theft of mail. Lampson testified on his own
behalf that he was present at the post office not to participate in the
crime but to dissuade his nephew from committing the offense. To but-
tress this defense, Lampson attempted to call an attorney for whom he
had previously worked and with whom he had discussed his concern
that his nephew stay out of trouble. The district court refused to admit
the attorney's testimony on relevancy grounds. And, although the Sev-
enth Circuit stated that it might "have been inclined to rule differently
on the question of relevance,"' 9 it refused to substitute its opinion for
v. Cartano, 420 F.2d 363 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1054 (1970) (vivid pictures of
murder victim's wounds admissible). Nor did the photos improperly imply the defend-
ants' guilt to the jury. See, e.g., United States v. Weir, 575 F.2d 668 (8th Cir. 1978)
(evidence of an attempt by the defendant to kill a suspected informant was considered
improper). The defendants overlook[ed] the fact that all evidence is "inherently prejudi-
cial" and that only "unfair prejudice, substantialy outweighing probative value ... per-
mits exclusion of relevant matter under Rule 403." United States v. McRae, 593 F.2d
700, 707 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 128 (1979) (emphasis in original). These
photos were relevant evidence properly admitted by the district court.
United States v. Thomas, No. 79-1465, slip op. at 7-8.
14. Id at 9. The agent noted that the only equipment in the warehouse was for the taking
apart of cars and that there was no equipment for the assembling, repairing or painting of cars.
Id
15. FED. R. EVID. 602 provides:
A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to
support a finding that he has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove per-
sonal knowledge may, but need not, consist of the testimony of the witness himself. This
rule is subject to the provisions of rule 703, relating to opinion testimony by expert
witnesses.
16. FED. R. EVID. 701 provides:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of opinions or
inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the
perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the
determination of a fact in issue.
17. Slip op. at 9. The Seventh Circuit also noted that none of the defendants' attorneys
objected at the time this evidence was elicited from the agent at trial. Rule 103 requires such a
contemporaneous objection.
18. 627 F.2d 62 (7th Cir. 1980).
19. Id at 66.
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that of the trial court absent a "clear showing of abuse of discretion. '20
Analyzing the relevance of the attorney's testimony, the Seventh
Circuit reasoned:
A question of relevancy must be raised in relation to the particu-
lar crime charged. Here, Lampson was indicted with two counts but
convicted on only one, the second count. Thus, questions of rele-
vancy of evidence based on count I (breaking and entering) are here
mooted by the acquittal on that count, and we need only address the
excluded testimony as it relates to count II (theft of mail).
Theft of mail under 18 U.S.C. § 1708 does include the element
of intent to steal at the time the mail is taken. . . . However, the
attorney's testimony was offered to corroborate Lampson's testimony
about his state of mind upon entering the post office-his motivation
for entering. The question here is narrow: whether it would have
been error for the Court to exclude the attorney's testimony based
upon its relevancy only to count II of the indictment.
Motivation or intent for entering the post office is separate and
distinct from the intent associated with the taking of the mail. Lamp-
son's purported concern for his nephew's behavior does not bear on
his act of removing mail from a post office .... 21
In United States v. Payne,22 the defendant was charged with con-
spiracy to transport stolen motor vehicles from Kentucky to Indiana in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2312 and to conceal and sell such vehicles in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2313. The trial court excluded evidence of-
fered by the defendant to show that he had previously purchased
automobiles in Detroit at less than "redbook" value. The defendant
argued that the excluded evidence would have tended to negate the
inference that he knew he was buying stolen cars because the price he
paid was less than the "redbook" value. The Seventh Circuit found the
evidence irrelevant and said that even if the evidence was of some re-
mote relevance, it was still properly excluded under rule 403 as tending
to cause confusion or undue delay and waste of time at trial.
It is difficult to square this conclusion with the court's statements
concerning the "abundant evidence" in the record from which the jury
could draw a "more solid inference of the defendant's guilty
knowledge." 23 The court went on to catalogue the bases of this solid
20. Id It is difficult to reconcile the conclusion the court reached in Greschner with its con-
clusion in Lampson. In both instances, evidence which tended to exculpate the defendant was
sought. In both instances, the evidence related to an essential fact at issue and no reasonable
alternative of proof was available. In Lampson, the court refused to substitute its judgment for
that of the trial court. In Greschner, however, the court found that the failure to admit the offered
evidence was reversible error and an abuse of discretion.
21. 627 F.2d at 66.
22. 635 F.2d 643 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 2050 (1981).
23. Id at 647.
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inference of guilt and, in doing so, seemed implicitly to support a con-
clusion that the proferred evidence was indeed relevant under the
broad parameters of rule 401. The final conclusion actually seems to
be grounded on a notion that the exclusion was harmless in light of the
abundant evidence of the defendant's guilt.
Relevancy and rule 403 were again the topic in United States v.
Koger24 in which the Seventh Circuit reversed a conviction for posses-
sion of three checks that had been stolen from the mail. At his trial,
Koger testified in his own behalf that he worked at the post office but
had not taken the checks and did not know they were stolen. He said
he had obtained the checks from a long-time friend named Stephanie
Green. Koger had rented an apartment to Green, and he said she gave
him one of the checks to pay her rent. He cashed the check and, after
deducting the rental payment, gave her the balance. He deposited a
second check she gave him into his account and gave her cash. Koger
said Green had finally given him a check for more than $100,000, say-
ing they could use the money to go into business together. He said he
had asked her to deposit the check in his account since he was on his
way to work at the time. He later withdrew $6,000 of this money. He
never saw Green again.
On cross-examination, Koger said he did not know if Green had
ever been convicted of a crime. The Government then introduced evi-
dence showing that Green had previously been convicted for embez-
zling mail while employed by the postal service and that she had been
incarcerated in July and August of 1978. The Government stated that
this evidence was offered to impeach Koger, and the district court ad-
mitted it into evidence over Koger's objections that its introduction vio-
lated rules 403 and 803(22). The evidence was shown to the jury, and
no limiting instruction was given until the next day when the court de-
voted a single paragraph of its eleven page jury charge to a statement
that the evidence of Green's criminal acts was to be considered only on
the issue of the credibility of Koger's testimony.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the evidence regarding
Green "did not and could not impeach Koger, because he testified he
did not know Green had been convicted. ' ' 25 Therefore, the court
stated, "[T]he exhibits regarding the conviction and jail term of a third
party (Green) for an offense not shown to have anything to do with the
charges against Koger were completely irrelevant and violated Rules
24. 646 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1981).
25. Id at 1198.
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401 and 402 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and, therefore, were
inadmissible. ' 26 Even if the evidence had been relevant, said the court,
its
probative value (if any) is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issue, or misleading the jury. In
other words, the exhibits were before the jury for all purposes and
without any limiting instructions for almost 24 hours. They could
have speculated during that period of time, as well as afterward, that
Green stole the checks and gave them to Ko~er, and that because
Green was convicted and served time for stealing the checks, Koger
knew they were stolen because of Green's conviction for that offense,
which he was bound to know about because of her absence from her
apartment during the period of incarceration. Such procedure is
highly speculative and theoretical at best and without proof and
should not be allowed in a criminal trial. It violates Rule 403 and
other Rules of Evidence and is highly prejudicial, and violates the
rule of presumption of innocence. 2"
Turning from the issue of relevancy, the court rejected the Gov-
ernment's argument-and the holding of the trial judge--that the ex-
hibits were not rendered inadmissible by rule 803(22)28 because they
were "'not offered to prove any fact essential to sustain the prior judg-
ment of [Green's] conviction.' ",29 The court stated that, notwithstand-
ing the offering statements of the prosecutor, the exhibits regarding
Green's conviction were offered to prove that Green had previously
been convicted of theft from the mail and that she had been incarcer-
ated during part of the time she lived in Koger's building.30
Quoting the Supreme Court's opinion in Kirby v. United States,3t
the Seventh Circuit held that the introduction into evidence of the ex-
hibits deprived Koger of the right of confrontation of witnesses in vio-
lation of the sixth amendment to the Constitution.32 In conclusion, the
court declared:
26. Id (footnote omitted).
27. Id (footnote omitted).
28. FED. R. EvlD. 803(22) provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is
available as a witness:
(22) Judgment of previous conviction. Evidence of a final judgment, entered after a
trial or upon a plea of guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo contendere), adjudging a
person guilty of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, to
prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment, but not including, when offered by the
Government in a criminal prosecution for purposes other than impeachment, judgments
against persons other than the accused. The pendency of an appeal may be shown but
does not affect admissibility.
29. 646 F.2d at 1199.
30. Id
31. 174 U.S. 49 (1899).
32. 646 F.2d at 1200.
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We are convinced that the introduction of the exhibits into evi-
dence subjected Koger to devastating and unfair prejudice, confused
the issues and perhaps misled the jury. It could be argued that this
phase of the case was presented and tried, as stated by the late Chief
udge Hutcheson of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Olinger v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 234 F.2d 823, 824 (1956), too
much on the theory of "Give a dog an ill name and hang him." 33
IMPEACHMENT: RULES 608(b) AND 609
In addition to discussing the relevancy of evidence purportedly of-
fered for impeachment in Koger,34 the Seventh Circuit addressed the
collateral impeachment by extrinsic evidence prohibition of rule
608(b) 35 in United States v. Payne.36 In Payne a defense witness denied
knowing a police detective seated at counsel table. In fact, the witness
had been stopped earlier that year by the officer for a traffic offense and
had been arrested when the officer discovered the witness was carrying
a pistol without a permit. The witness had subsequently been con-
victed. After the witness denied knowing the officer, the prosecution
was permitted to follow up that answer by asking the witness if he had
been convicted in the preceding 12-month period.
Without discussion or citation of authority, the Seventh Circuit
found that the trial court was correct in permitting such "proper" ques-
tions. However, the court failed to specify what it meant by "proper"
questions. The first question, concerning the witness' recognition of the
officer, arguably addresses the issue of the witness' ability to recollect.
The witness' failure to remember an individual involved in a signifi-
cant, recent event would perhaps suggest a general inability to recollect
accurately. The second question asked of the witness presents a much
more difficult problem regarding the propriety of permitting the prose-
33. Id (footnote omitted).
34. See notes 24-33 and accompanying text supra.
35. FED. R. EVID. 608(b) provides:
Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or sup-
porting his credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in rule 609, may not be
Eroved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if pro-
ative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the
witness (1) concerning his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning
the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character
the witness being cross-examined has testified.
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness, does hot
operate as a waiver of his privilege against self-incrimination when examined with re-
spect to matters which relate only to credibility.
36. 635 F.2d 643 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 2050 (1981). See notes 22-23 and
accompanying text supra.
424
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cutor to "follow up" his inquiry into the witness' ability to recall the
officer by asking him about his previous criminal convictions.
The question about the prior convictions seems to demand a two
stage scrutiny in this case. First, since the question was directed at a
collateral matter-the witness' ability to recognize a particular police
officer-it must be determined whether rule 608(b) would permit im-
peachment of his statement that he failed to recognize the officer by
evidence of his previous conviction on a charge lodged against him by
that officer. Second, if rule 608(b) would bar such evidence, it must be
determined whether the evidence could nevertheless come in as an im-
peaching prior conviction under rule 609. If evidence of the prior con-
viction could not be admitted under either of these theories to perfect
the prosecution's attempted impeachment, it is difficult to see how the
prosecution could argue in good faith that it had a basis in fact for
asking the impeaching question once the witness denied knowing the
officer.37
Under rule 608(b), the follow up question was plainly inappropri-
ate. The rule provides that specific instances of the conduct of a wit-
ness, for the purpose of attacking his credibility, may not be proved by
extrinsic evidence. 38 Thus, if the witness had stood his ground and de-
nied any previous convictions when the prosecutor inquired about such
convictions in an attempt to impeach the witness' recollection, the pros-
ecutor would have been required to "take [the witness'] answer. ' 39 The
prosecutor would not have been permitted to call other witnesses or
produce records to perfect the impeachment by proving that the witness
did have prior convictions.40
37. See Davis v. Freels, 583 F.2d 337 (7th Cir. 1978); T. MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL
TECHNIQUES 281-84 (1980).
38. See note 35 supra.
39. See MCCoRMiCK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 84 (2d ed. 1972).
40. See id.; Davis v. Freels, 583 F.2d 337 (7th Cir. 1978). Davis was a civil action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 in which a police officer was being sued for shooting a suspect. The jury found for
the police officer and the plaintiff appealed. In discussing one of the plaintiff/appellant's allega-
tions of error, the Seventh Circuit made the following observations:
On direct examination, appellant testified that he owned two auto repair shops and
Wallaces Rib Shop and that he was going to one of the auto repair shops at the time he
was shot by Freels. On cross-examination he was asked whether he had filed income tax
returns for 1973, 1974, and 1975. Appellant's objection was overruled, and he contends
that this was error. Appellee argues that the questioning about income tax returns was
for the purpose of casting doubt on appellant's credibility regarding his ownership of the
three businesses, and that failure to report any income from those businesses would be
inconsistent with such claimed ownership. This theory of admissibility was not the one
relied on at trial, where defendant's counsel justified the question as going to the plain-
tiffs general credibility as a witness. We offer the following observations because, as
concluded infra, the case must be retried. Whether appellant owned the three businesses
was an issue injected into the case by appellant himself in an effort, apparently, to bolster
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Only if the witness' prior conviction had been admissible under
rule 609 would it have been subject to proof by extrinsic evidence, thus
justifying the impeaching question about prior convictions.4' However,
the facts of the case do not indicate that the previous conviction would
have been admissible under rule 609. There is nothing to show that the
crime of which the witness had been convicted was punishable by im-
prisonment in excess of one year. This is a threshold for admissibility
of a conviction under rule 609. Therefore, it is possible that the prose-
cutor attempted to link the witness' knowledge of the police officer to
an inquiry regarding the conviction in order to argue that by failing to
recognize the detective the witness had opened the door to proof of a
conviction which was punishable by less than one year. If the witness
honestly did not recall, however, it is difficult to accept a finding that
his prior conviction would be impeaching of his failure to recognize the
detective at trial. In any event, the court failed to establish that the
conviction was for a crime punishable by more than one year.42
Equally as troubling, the Seventh Circuit failed to establish whether the
trial court balanced the risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant against
the evidence's probative value as required by rule 609(a)(1). 43
The value of impeachment by proof of a prior conviction where
his own credibility and to blunt the possible inference that he lacked any good reason to
be where he was at the place and time of the incident. The issue being collateral, 3A J
Wigmore Evidence § 1003 (Chadbourne ed. 1970), it cannot be the subject of independ-
ent evidence, id, § 1001. The question and answer are all the fiy will hear. For this
reason, the trial judge, in exercising his discretion to allow cross-examination bearing on
such an issue, ought to satisfy himself that there is a basis in fact for the ultimate infer-
ence the cross-examiner would have the trier of fact draw, in this case that appellant did
not own the businesses. At the new trial, which we conclude yfra must be granted, the
judge will be guided by what we have said.
Id at 341-42 (emphasis added).
While the additional witness bar is the often used standard for determining whether extrinsic
evidence is involved, see, e.g., United States v. Cohen, 631 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir. 1980), a more
difficult question arises when the examiner attempts to pursue "extrinsic" matters with the same
witness. In United States v. Pisari, 636 F.2d 851 (1st Cir. 1981), the court reversed a conviction
and held that calling a witness to rebut testimony given by the defendant as to his non-involve-
ment in a prior robbery was improper. The court stated that the examiner must "take the answer"
of the witness.
41. FED. R. EviD. 609 provides:
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evi-
dence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or
established by public record during cross-examination but only if the crime (1) was pun-
ishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he
was convicted, and the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evi-
dence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or
false statement, regardless of the punishment.
42. Indeed, under the law of Indiana, the jurisdiction where the witness had been convicted,
a conviction for a first offense of illegally carrying a gun is not punishable by a sentence of more
than one year. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-23-4.1-3, -18, -50-3.2 (Burns 1979).
43. See note 41 supra.
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the crime does not relate to dishonesty or false statement is question-
able.44 It is thus important to adhere strenuously to certain safeguards
when such an inquiry is pursued. First, where possible, the parties
should consider use of a motion in limine in which to raise the issue.45
The use of such motions insures fundamental fairness and can aid
counsel in making tactical decisions regarding the litigation. Second, it
is essential where such evidence is offered that the court determine that
its probative value outweighs the possibility of unfair prejudice to the
defendant. The Seventh Circuit has "urge[d] trial judges to make such
determinations after a hearing on the record. . . and to explicitly find
that the prejudicial effect of the evidence to the defendant will be out-
weighed by its probative value." 46 Third, the trial court should, where
possible, give a limiting instruction regarding the use of such testimony
immediately after the witness' testimony. And even where the court
gives such an instruction, counsel would be well advised to request an-
other such instruction to the jury on the same point at the conclusion of
the case.
The issue of whether the attempted impeachment is collateral or
noncollateral is a frequently recurring problem under rule 608 for both
courts and litigants. Within this general dilemma is the question of
which party created the basis of the collateral/noncollateral issue: was
the question which prompted the attempted impeachment asked by the
tendering party or his adversary? In a different but somewhat related
context, the Supreme Court recently addressed the question of whether
the use of illegally obtained evidence for impeachment is permitted
when the questioning which "opens the door" to impeachment by such
evidence occurs during cross-examination. The traditional view had
been that only testimony elicited by questioning during direct examina-
tion could be impeached by use of illegally seized evidence. 47 That
view has now been repudiated by the Supreme Court. 4
44. See, e.g., Gertz v. Fitchburg R.R., 137 Mass. 77 (1884) in which Judge Holmes observed:
[Wihen it is proved that a witness has been convicted of a crime, the only ground for
disbelieving him which such proof affords is the general readiness to do evil which the
conviction may be supposed to show. It is from that general disposition alone that the
jury is asked to infer a readiness to lie in the particular case, and thence that he has lied
in fact. The evidence has no tendency to prove that he was mistaken, but only that he
has perjured himself, and it reaches the conclusion solely through the general proposi-
tion that he is a bad character and unworthy of credit.
Id. at 78.
45. See 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGE, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE 609[03a] at 607-79 (1977).
46. United States v. Mahone, 537 F.2d 922, 929 (7th Cir. 1976).
47. See Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20
(1925).
48. See United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980). In Havens, the Supreme Court under-
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SIMILAR ACTS: RULE 404(b)
In United States v. DeJohn,49 the Seventh Circuit examined the use
of similar acts evidence offered by the Government under rule 404(b).50
cut the traditional understanding that the Government may use illegally obtained evidence only to
impeach statements made by a defendant on direct examination. Havens and a companion had
flown from Lima, Peru to Miami, Florida. During a customs search in Miami, Havens' compan-
ion was discovered to be carrying cocaine sewed into makeshift pockets on a T-shirt he was wear-
ing. He implicated Havens, who had already cleared customs, and Havens was arrested. Havens'
luggage was illegally seized and searched. Inside was a T-shirt from which had been cut pieces of
material matching the pieces used to make the cocaine pouches in his companion's T-shirt. This
evidence was suppressed prior to Havens' trial on various drug related charges. At his trial,
Havens took the witness stand in his own defense and denied any knowledge of involvement in
the cocaine smuggling, despite the assertions of his former companion, who had testified for the
Government. On direct examination, Havens gave the following testimony:
Q. And you heard Mr. McLeroth testify earlier as to something to the effect that
this material was taped or draped around his body and so on, you heard that testimony?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Did you ever engage in that kind of activity with Mr. McLeroth and Augusto
or Mr. McLeroth and anyone else on that fourth visit to Lima, Peru?
A. I did not.
446 U.S. at 622. On cross-examination Havens testified as follows:
Q. Now, on direct examination, sir, you testified that on the fourth trip you had
absolutely nothing to do with the wrapping of any bandages or tee shirts or anything
involving Mr. McLeroth; is that correct.
A. I don't-I said I had nothing to do with any wrapping or bandages or anything,
yes. I had nothing to do with anything with McLeroth in connection with this cocaine
matter.
Q. And your testimony is that you had nothing to do with the sewing of the cotton
swatches to make pockets on that tee shirt?
A. Absolutely not.
Q. Sir, when you came through Customs, the Miami International Airport, on Oc-
tober 2, 1977, did you have in your suitcase Size 38-40 medium tee shirts?
An objection to the latter question was overruled and questioning continued:
Q. On that day, sir, did you have in your luggage a Size 38-40 medium man's tee
shirt with swatches of clothing missing from the tail of that tee shirt?
A. Not to my knowledge.
Q. Mr. Havens, I'm going to hand you what is Government's Exhibit 9 for identifi-
cation and ask you if this tee shirt was in your luggage on October 2nd, 1975 [sic]?
A. Not to my knowledge. No.
Id at 622-23. Havens also denied having told a Government agent that the T-shirts found in his
luggage belonged to his companion, McLeroth. On rebuttal, a Government agent testified that the
T-shirt with the pieces cut out (Exhibit 9) had been found in Havens' suitcase and that Havens
had said the T-shirts in his bag, including Exhibit 9, belonged to McLcroth. Exhibit 9 was then
admitted into evidence, with an instruction to the jury that the rebuttal evidence should be consid-
ered only for impeaching Havens' credibility. Id at 623.
The Fifth Circuit reversed Havens' conviction, holding that illegally seized evidence may be
used for impeachment only if the evidence contradicts a particular statement made by a defendant
in the course of his direct examination. The Supreme Court then reversed the Fifth Circuit. The
Court held that a defendant's statements made during proper cross-examination "reasonably sug-
gested by the defendant's direct examination" were subject to impeachment by illegally seized
evidence which was inadmissible during the Government's direct case. Id at 627-28.
49. 638 F.2d 1048 (7th Cir. 1981).
50. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of
a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
In DeJohn, the court affirmed a conviction on a charge of uttering and
publishing two United States Treasury checks in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 495. The defendant challenged his conviction on the ground that the
trial court had impermissibly allowed testimony of his activities on
other occasions.
Specifically, the Seventh Circuit approved the trial judge's admis-
sion of testimony by a security guard that, on another occasion, he had
arrested the defendant when he had found him near the same mail box
from which the stolen checks were taken in this case. Similarly, the
court approved the trial judge's admission of a police officer's testi-
mony that, on an earlier occasion, unrelated to the charge for which the
defendant was on trial, the officer had found a treasury check on the
defendant while searching him at the police station.
Holding that this testimony was properly admitted under rule
404(b), the court discussed the "opportunity" portion of that rule. Dis-
tinguishing cases which the defendant relied on in arguing that the sim-
ilar acts evidence was improperly admitted, the court pointed out that
there is less danger of prejudice in using such evidence to show oppor-
tunity than to show intent or malice. In this connection the court
stated:
[The cases cited by the defendant] deal with the admissibility of simi-
lar crimes evidence directed to the issues of intent and motive, and
this particularly is pertinent for the last of the four points that de-
fendant contends governs admissibility. See United States v. Fierson,
419 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1969). Here the testimony was directed to
defendant's opportunity to obtain the checks. It is important to avoid
unnecessary use of similar acts evidence on the issues of intent and
motive because the evidence may be unduly prejudicial on subjective
issues of a defendant's conduct. "Opportunity" is not a subjective
issue: either defendant had access to the checks or he did not. De-
fendant's theory of the case as a practical matter brought into promi-
nence the issue of opportunity even though he did not "dispute" it in
the common use of that term. In this context, actual dispute of the
issue is not required. Compare United States v. Weidman, 572 F.2d
1199 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821, 99 S. Ct. 87, 58 L. Ed. 2d
113 (1978) (defendant need not dispute element of specific intent in
order to permit into evidence similar bad acts bearing on intent since
prosecution must prove that element to make its case).5 '
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
51. 638 F.2d at 1052 n.4. The defendant had argued that in order for the similar acts evi-
dence in this case to be admissible, the acts must be:
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The court then addressed the defendant's contention that the trial
judge should have balanced the probative value of the testimony
against its prejudicial effect and stated in writing his reasons for admit-
ting it. The Seventh Circuit declared that it would be preferable for
judges to set down their rule 403 analysis in writing. But, where that
was not done and the balance clearly favored admission of the testi-
mony, the court said that it would "not presume that the evidence was
admitted for the wrong reason. '52
SUBSEQUENT REMEDIAL MEASURES: RULE 407
For the trial practitioner, Oberst v. International Harvester Co. 53
provides a significant discussion of rule 40754 in the context of strict
liability cases. Oberst was injured in a 1975 accident while riding in the
sleeping compartment of a truck manufactured by International Har-
vester. At the time of the accident, the sleeping compartment was
designed with two vertical restraining straps approximately thirty-six
inches apart in the front of the compartment. As a result of the acci-
1) similar enough and close enough in time to the offense to be relevant; 2) shown by
clear and convincing evidence to have occurred; 3) of not so prejudicial a nature as to
outweigh their probative value; 4) relevant to an issue disputed by defendant.
Id
In his concurring opinion, Judge Cudahy highlighted the difficult problems involved in using
this sort of evidence:
The most troublesome aspect of this case involves the liberal admission of testimony
about other "bad acts", ostensibly to show that the defendant had the "opportunity to
gain access to the mailboxes and obtain the checks".... Although the evidence was
relevant only to establish this simple objective fact, it also revealed the extraneous spec-
tacles of the defendant's "arrest" by a security guard (who testified that he "held [the
defendant] for the police and called the City police") and of a subsequent (and unre-
lated) search of the defendant by a police officer at police headquarters.
Perhaps if these events were probative of something as relatively complex and elu-
sive as "consciousness of guilt" . . . these embellishments, as conveyed by live testi-
mony, would have been appropriate. But simply to show the plain fact of opportunity to
gain access to the checks, a straightforward stipulation would seem to have been equally
probative and considerably less prejudicial.
Id at 1060 (Cudahy, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
See also United States v. Pisari, 636 F.2d 855 (1st Cir. 1981) (in which the court held im-
proper the admission of evidence of the defendant's use of a knife in a prior robbery to show
identity); United States v. Bramble, 641 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1981) (in which the court held improper
the admission of evidence of a previous conviction for possession of marijuana to show a predis-
position to sell cocaine).
52. 638 F.2d at 1053.
53. 640 F.2d 863 (7th Cir. 1980).
54. FED. R. EviD. 407 provides:
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would have
made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissi-
ble to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event. This rule does
not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another
purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if
controverted, or impeachment.
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dent, Oberst was ejected from the sleeping compartment into the front
seat and partially through the windshield.
Part of the evidence Oberst attempted to introduce at trial demon-
strated a post-accident change made by International Harvester in the
types of bunk restraints installed in its trucks. The district court re-
fused to admit this evidence, apparently on the basis of rule 407. 55 On
appeal to the Seventh Circuit, Oberst argued that rule 407 was inappli-
cable to actions such as his where strict liability was asserted. His argu-
ment was that the first sentence of the rule applies only to actions
involving negligence or culpable conduct, which obviously do not in-
dude strict liability actions, and that the second sentence merely cre-
ates an exception to the first sentence. Under this theory, evidence of
subsequent repair would be admissible for any purpose in a strict lia-
bility action.
Discussing admissibility under both Illinois law and federal rule
407, the majority found that the weight of authority in Illinois rejected
a theory such as that propounded by Oberst. The court stated that,
while evidence of a post-accident change could be admitted under rule
407 to show feasibility of an alternative design, that was so only where
feasibility was controverted. The majority found that there was no
such controversy in Oberst and upheld the exclusion, saying that, even
if it had been error, it was only harmless error as to Oberst's claims. 5 6
In dissent, Judge Swygert began with an interesting discussion in a
footnote of whether admissibility of post-accident design changes
should be governed in diversity actions by state law or the Federal
Rules of Evidence. The judge concluded that the question need not be
decided in Oberst because there was no conflict between rule 407 and
its Illinois counterpart.5 7
55. 640 F.2d at 865.
56. Id at 866.
57. Judge Swygert's discussion on this point is set forth in full:
The question whether the admissibility of the disputed evidence is governed by state
or federal law is a difficult one. See generally O.G. Wellborn III, The Federal Rules of
Evidence and the Application of State Law in the Federal Courts, 55 Tex. L. Rev. 371
(1977). This action was commenced after the effective date of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. See P.L. 93-595, § 1, 88 Stat. 1926 (January 2, 1975). Generally, even in a diver-
sity case such as this, the Federal Rules of Evidence govern all evidentiary questions,
except where they specifically refer to state law. Pollard v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 598
F.2d 1284, 1286 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 100 S. Ct. 232 (1979) (admission of
documents); accord, Johnson v. William C. Ellis & Sons Iron Works, 604 F.2d 950, 957
(5th Cir. 1979); Gibbs v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 544 F.2d 423, 428, n.2 (9th Cir.
1976); see, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 302, 501. Unlike most of the other Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, however, Rule 407 is based primarily upon policy considerations and not upon
relevancy or concern for truth finding. Advisory Committee Notes, Fed. R. Evid. 407.
See also Fed. R. Evid. 408 (compromise and offers to compromise). For this reason, it is
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Turning to the applicability of rule 407, Judge Swygert found that
the majority's conclusion that feasibility was not controverted was re-
futed by the record.5 8 Furthermore, he stated that rule 407 permitted
the use of evidence of subsequent remedial measures for impeachment
purposes and that in this case the excluded evidence was part of
Oberst's effort to impeach certain key testimony of the defendant's pri-
mary witness.
Beyond this, Judge Swygert agreed with Oberst that rule 407 prob-
ably does not apply at all in strict liability actions.5 9 This was sup-
ported by a literal interpretation of the rule, said the judge, because
"where strict liability is asserted, neither negligence nor culpable con-
duct need be shown. In such cases, liability depends upon the charac-
ter of the product and not upon that of the defendant. '60 The judge
also pointed out that, although many federal courts have assumed that
rule 407 applies in strict liability actions, several have stated that it does
debatable whether Rule 407 or a conflicting state rule should govern in a diversity case.
See 2 Weinstein's Evidence 407 [objections of Prof. Schwartz to Rule 407 at Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, House Committee on the Judiciary, 93rd
Cong., 1st Sess., Rules of Evidence (Supp.), Ser. No. 2, p. 303 (1973)]; Wellborn, supra;
see generally McCormick, Evidence § 275 (2d ed. 1972). This question apparently has
not ben addressed directly by any federal court, but the Fifth Circuit's analysis in Con-
way v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc., 540 F.2d 837 (5th Cir. 1976) (on rehearing) is
of assistance. There, the court was faced with a Texas rule of evidence which permitted
the impeachment of a widow suing for the wrongful death of her husband with proof of
the fact of her subsequent ceremonial marriage. Apparently using a balancing analysis
under Fed. R. Evid. 403, the district court refused to permit such impeachment. The
Fifth Circuit reversed, saying that the Texas rule was a rare state rule of evidence which
was so intimately related to state substantive law that it should be applied in a diversity
action to prevent forum shopping. Another example of such a rule might be the parol
evidence rule which is widely considered to be a part of the law of contracts, although it
is couched in terms of the law of evidence. See Wigmore, Evidence § 2400 (3d ed. 1940).
The Supreme Court recently has reaffirmed the analysis of problems such as the one
presented here, which was set forth in Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). See
Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.,- U.S. -, 100 S. Ct. 1978 (1980). Pursuant to that analy-
sis, where, as here, a federal and state rule both govern the issue in dispute and are in
conflict, the federal rule is applied in a diversity case if it is arguably procedural. But,
where there is no pertinent federal rule, usually a specific state rule will be applied. See,
e.g., Walker, supra (method of commencing action for purposes of statute of limitations
controlled by state law rather than by Fed. R. Civ. P. 3). In Conway, application of the
Hanna analysis was relatively simple because the federal rules were silent on the issue at
hand. Therefore, the state rule applied. In this case, application of the analysis is more
difficult than in Conway because the state and federal rules both govern the evidentiary
problem presented. Although Rule 407 is based primarily upon policy grounds, it is
arguably evidentiary (i.e., procedural). Therefore, it, and not a conflicting state rule,
probably applies in a diversity case. As discussed in the text, we need not decide this
question in this case because there is no conflict between Rule 407 and its Illinois
counterpart.
Id at 867-68 n.2 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
58. Id at 868.
59. Id at 869.
60. Id (citing Sutkowski v. Universal Marion Corp., 5 I11. App. 3d 313, 281 N.E.2d 749
(1972)).
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not.6I
Examining the background of rule 407 and its underlying policies,
the dissent found support for the conclusion that rule 407 is inapplica-
ble in strict liability actions.62 First, finding rule 407 comparable to
section 1151 of the California Evidence Code, Judge Swygert analyzed
the "seminal" case of Au/t v. International Harvester Co. 63 Au/t had
held that whatever tendency a rule excluding evidence of post-accident
design changes had toward achieving its policy goals in other types of
cases, it was not sufficiently effective in achieving those goals to justify
its application in strict liability actions. The judge said that this conclu-
sion has been widely accepted by legislatures, courts, and commenta-
tors.64 Judge Swygert then stated:
In strict liability cases, an exclusionary rule is unlikely to achieve its
ostensible objective, primarily because the exceptions to the rule
make exclusion uncertain, if not unlikely. Ultimately, admissibility
depends upon the effectiveness of the plaintiff's trial tactics in getting
the defendant to "controvert" feasibility or opening itself to im-
peachment. Many defendants may be unaware of the rule. It is il-
logical to assume that such defendants will alter their behavior
bedause of it. Of the defendants who are aware of the rule, most will
be insured. Their insurers are likely to encourage or require them to
mitigate losses by taking remedial measures, regardless of the exist-
ence of an exclusionary rule. Some remedial measures may be re-
quired by regulatory authorities. Potential defendants are not likely
to violate regulatory mandates because of the lack of an exclusionary
rule. See generallAull; Note, 44 Cin. L. Rev. 637 (1975). With re-
spect to the federal rule, in particular, because most products liability
cases are litigated in state court, the only basis for federal jurisdiction
being diversity, the coercive effect of an exclusionary rule is negligi-
61. Id (citing Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1978) (dictum); Robbins v.
Farmer's Union Grain Terminal Assoc., 552 F.2d 788, 792 (8th Cir. 1977); Farner v. Paccar, Inc.,
562 F.2d 518 (8th Cir. 1977) (dictum)).
62. Id at 870. For other discussions of the applicability of rule 407, see Arceneaux v. Tex-
aco, 623 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1980); Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980).
63. 13 Cal. 3d 113, 528 P.2d 1148, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1974). The language of rule 407 was
derived from that of CAL. EVID. CODE § 1151. McCoRMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF Evi-
DENCE § 275 (2d ed. Supp. 1978).
64. 640 F.2d at 870. The following authorities were cited as examples of those which had
accepted the Ault court's policy analysis:
Me. R. Evid. 407 (evidence of subsequent remedial measures admissible for any
legitimate purpose even in negligence cases); Wyo. R. Evid. 407 (specifically allowing
such evidence in strict liability cases); Okla. R. Evid. 407 (same as Wyoming) (discussed
in Kutner, A Comparative Outline of the Oklahoma Evidence Code and the Federal Rules
of Evidence, 32 Okla. L. Rev. 355, 376 (1979)); Barry v. Manglass, 55 A.D.2d 1, 389
N.Y.S.2d 870 (2d Dept. 1976); Note, Post-Accident Repairs and Offers of Compromise.-
Shaping Exclusionary Rules to Public Policy, 10 Loy. Chi. L.J. 487, 491 (1979); Lampert
& Saltzburg, A Modern Approach to Evidence, 189 & n.21 (1977); 2 Weinstein 's Evidence
407[02]; McCormick, Evidence § 77 (1st ed. 1954).
Id n.7.
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ble. Consequently, safeguards other than Rule 407 should be used.65
Finally, the judge concluded, "[Elven if Rule 407 does apply to
strict liability actions, the factors weighing against its efficacy suggest a
more generous application of the rule than either the trial court or the
majority have given it in this case."'66
On the question of admissibility of the evidence under Illinois law,
the judge disputed the majority's conclusion that an Illinois case sup-
porting admissibility, Burke v. Illinois Power Co. ,67 had been wrongly
decided.68 Judge Swygert also pointed out that recent Illinois cases
clearly demonstrate that Illinois has adopted the Ault position.69
PRIVILEGE: RULE 501
The scope of privilege under rule 50170 was discussed in several
opinions this past term. One such case was In re Special September
1978 Grand Jury (11).71 After the initial panel decision in this case on
April 30, 1980, the Seventh Circuit denied a petition for rehearing but
modified its initial opinion. On December 19, 1980, the court issued its
modified opinion. The case involved a grand jury investigation of a
currency exchange association. The grand jury had subpoenaed
records held by two law firms which had represented the association.
Addressing a claim that the records were protected by the attorney-
client privilege, the court noted that the attorney-client privilege be-
longs to the client alone. Therefore, the second time around in In re
Special September 1978 Grand Jury (II), the court persisted in its hold-
ing that ongoing fraud by the client negates the attorney-client privi-
lege. Turning to the question of whether the client's fraud foreclosed
protection of the records under the work product rule, the court held
that lawyers representing the client could assert the work product doc-
65. Id
66. Id at 870-71.
67. 57 I11. App. 3d 498, 373 N.E.2d 1354 (1978).
68. 640 F.2d at 871.
69. Id (citing Smith v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 74 II. App. 3d 818, 393 N.E.2d 598 (1979);
Christopherson v. Hyster Co., 58 I11. App. 3d 791, 374 N.E.2d 858 (1978)).
70. FED. R. EvID. 501 provides:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided
by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision
thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be inter-
preted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience. However,
in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to
which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, govern-
ment, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State
law.
71. 640 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1980).
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trine, even where the client engaged in fraud, but only to prevent dis-
closure of "the attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions
and legal theories about the case."7 2
In FTC v. Shaffner,73 the Seventh Circuit rejected a "blanket
claim" of attorney-client privilege and required the party claiming the
privilege to "present the underlying facts demonstrating the existence
of the privilege."' 74 Citing Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Associ-
ation,75 the Seventh Circuit stated:
This is not to say that the party must detail the contents of each com-
munication, for that would indeed violate the privilege. But the
party must supply the court with sufficient information from which it
could reasonably conclude that the communication: (1) concerned
the seeking of legal advice; (2) was between a client and an attorney
acting in his professional capacity; (3) was related to legal matters;
and (4) is at the client's instance permanently protected76
In Martin-Trigona v. Gouletas,77 the Seventh Circuit reviewed an
order of the district court finding Trigona, a judgment debtor, to be a
recalcitrant witness. Trigona's recalcitrance, for which he was incarcer-
ated pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a), arose out of supplementary pro-
ceedings to discover his assets. Trigona had failed to respond to the
initial citation to discover assets. In an apparent attempt to purge him-
self of the contempt order resulting from that initial failure, Trigona
represented that he was willing to respond to the citation. In a hearing
before a magistrate, Trigona refused to answer 169 questions, invoking
his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. In his report
to Judge Decker, the magistrate found certain invocations of the fifth
amendment privilege by Trigona to be well taken as to certain ques-
tions, but found others to be inapplicable or waived.
The inquiry continued before Judge Decker who conducted a re-
72. Id at 63. For another discussion of this case, see Crowley, Modernizing and Liberalizing
the Law of Evidence, 57 CHi. KENT L. REV. 191, 204-05 (1981). Similar issues were addressed by
several other courts during the past term. See, e.g., United States v. Winner, 641 F.2d 825 (9th
Cir. 198 1) (law enforcement investigation privilege); In re Grand Jury Proceeding Involving Berk-
ley & Co., 629 F.2d 548 (8th Cir. 1980) (fraud voiding attorney-client privilege); United States v.
Entrekin, 624 F.2d 597 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 2049 (1981) (interspousal privilege);
Champion Intl Corp. v. International Paper Co., 486 F. Supp. 1328 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (inadvertent
disclosure of "slight" amount of privileged material not worthy of attorney-client privilege protec-
tion). See also Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980); United States v. Burton, 629 F.2d
975 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1487 (1981).
73. 626 F.2d 32 (7th Cir. 1980).
74. Id at 37.
75. 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963). In Radiant, the court stated, "The limitation surrounding
any information sought must be determined for each document separately considered on a case-
by-case basis." Id at 324.
76. 626 F.2d at 37.
77. 634 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
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newed hearing to allow Trigona to explain why "seemingly innocuous"
questions might elicit incriminating information. As a result of the
hearing, Judge Decker held that Trigona could not rely on the fifth
amendment as to some questions and that his assertions of lack of
memory and absence of knowledge were made in bad faith. Judge
Decker found Trigona in contempt and ordered him confined until he
answered the questions.
Addressing the self-incrimination aspect of Trigona's "three-
pronged" 78 attack on the district court's order, the Seventh Circuit
agreed with the district court that Trigona's fears of criminal prosecu-
tion were "well-founded." That fear alone, however, did not justify
Trigona's refusal to answer questions on fifth amendment grounds
since "the pendency of criminal proceedings does not by itself excuse a
witness of his obligation to give testimony in civil proceedings. Some
nexus between the risk of criminal conviction and the information re-
quested must exist." 79
Finding that Trigona had offered "little explanation" to the trial
court in support of his fifth amendment claim, the Seventh Circuit said
78. The three "prong[s]" of Trigona's "attack" were described by the Seventh Circuit as
follows:
First, Trigona maintains that several of the questions asked were irrelevant, ie., the in-
formation they sought to elicit could not aid in discovering his current assets. Second,
Trigona declares that the district court erred in finding that his claims of lack of memory
or knowledge were made in bad faith. Finally, Trigona argues that the district court
improperly held that the Fifth Amendment did not shield Trigona from answering most
of the remaining questions put to him.
Id at 356.
The "attack" became a rout as the Seventh Circuit dispatched each of Trigona's contentions
in turn, stating, "Trigona has proved to be an extremely uncooperative litigant." Id at 357. An
examination of those portions of the record of the district court hearing quoted by the Seventh
Circuit supports the court's characterization of Trigona as "extremely uncooperative." In af-
firming the district court's finding that Trigona had engaged in a bad faith refusal to answer
questions, the Seventh Circuit set out the following excerpt from the record:
The Court: [W]hat is your usual business, profession or occupation at this time?
The Witness: I don't know.
The Court: Do you have any business?
The Witness: I don't know how to answer that question. I am not sure.
The Court: Are you engaged in any profession?
The Witness: I am not sure I can answer that question.
The Court: Do you have any occupation at all?
The Witness: My time at this time-
The Court: And this relates to seventy-
The Witness: -is involved in the defense of this litigation and criminal prosecution. So
if you are talking about occupation by devotion of assets, I would say-
The Court: No, I am talking about-
The Witness: --then I would say about 95 percent of my time is being devoted to re-
sponding to the Gouletases and to the federal government and to the state government.
Id at 357-58 (citations to transcript omitted).
79. Id at 360.
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the trial court was not bound to accept that explanation at face value.80
The court stated:
"It is clear that the trial court has the discretion to assess the facts
which underlie an asserted claim of Fifth Amendment privilege." In
re Folding Carton Antirust Litigation, 609 F.2d 867, 871 n.5 (7th Cir.
1979). "The trial judge in appraising the claim 'must be governed as
much by his personal perception of the peculiarities of the case as by
the facts actually in evidence.'" Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S.
at 487, 71 S. Ct. at 818 .... The trial court reasonably concluded
that Trigona's claim of commingling was speculative and overbroad
and that the privilege was claimed in bad faith in order to hinder the
appellees from collecting upon their judgment. There is ample rea-
son to believe that Trigona's claimed fear of self-incrimination is fan-
ciful. The tendency of this witness to exaggerate, to believe himself
the victim of conspiracies where none exist, and to suspect without
any reasonable basis that others are persecuting him is evident from
many of his filings in this record. The evasiveness of this witness, his
discredited claims of lack of memory, his failure to offer any credible
explanation as to how answers to seemingly innocuous questions
might be incriminating, his personal interest in frustrating the efforts
of the appellees to collect upon their judgment are "peculiarities of
the case' which the trial court could properly consider in directing
the appellant to answer. The failure of Trigona to obey those direc-
tions was properly found to constitute contempt of court."'
Affirming the contempt finding of the trial court, the Seventh Cir-
cuit reaffirmed the principle that a witness seeking to invoke the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination in a civil proceeding
need not establish that an answer will indeed incriminate him but must
at least tender some "credible reason" why an answer would pose a real
danger of incrimination.8 2
CONCLUSION
During the 1980-81 term, the Seventh Circuit rendered a number
of decisions which aided the continuing process of refining the Federal
Rules of Evidence. These opinions of the court must be reviewed as
"bricks" in the larger "wall" of evidence rules, the remainder of which
will be built over time, on a case-by-case basis, with logic and a just
result as the binding mortar.
80. Id at 361.
81. Id at 361-62 (footnote omitted).
82. Trigona may only be of value to the practitioner as a clear example of behavior which
will not justify invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination. A much clearer guide to
when the privilege may be asserted can be found in last term's decision of In re Folding Carton
Antitrust Litigation, 609 F.2d 876 (7th Cir. 1979).

